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FACTS DISPUTED FROM APPELLEE'S 
"STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDER LYING THE ORIGINAL SUIT." 
The following numbered facts of appellee Norton are either 
disputed or misleading. 
7. This fact infers that "NSI selected" a container that was 
especially designed for it. In fact, NSI ordered one of a number 
of standard models of complete containers which were designed and 
manufactured by Norton, and offered for sale, 
11. This fact infers that the soap which NSI placed in the 
container created pressure inside the can. That is not accurate. 
Dr. Noel De Nevers' affidavit filed in the present law suit makes 
it clear that the container was pressurized by moving the sealed 
container from an area of high atmospheric pressure (low altitude 
on the coast of California) to an area of low atmospheric pressure 
(due to high altitude in Salt Lake City) . The pressure was not 
created by the soap. The same pressure would have been created had 
the container been filled with water or even if it were empty. 
(See Affidavit of Dr. Noel De Nevers in this case, Addendum 1) 
14. Norton quotes from Dr. De Nevers' deposition in the prior 
case and complains that he never said the product was "defective." 
In Dr. De Nevers' affidavit he stated that w. . .a container which 
allows the seal to be propelled at these speeds [30 to 160 mph] 
because of normal altitude and temperature differences which 
regularly occur during normal shipping is unreasonably dangerous." 
(See Affidavit of Dr. Noel De Nevers, Addendum 1) 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT INDEMNITY CLAIMS 
POINT I: RES JUDICATA APPLIES WHEN CLAIMS ARE "FAIRLY AND FULLY 
LITIGATED" BETWEEN PARTIES, NOT WHEN THERE IS "NO 
STANDING" TO LITIGATE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Appellee Norton argues that the claims for indemnity ". . . 
have already been briefed, argued, and litigated between NSI and 
Norton and determined as a matter of law. . ." because of the prior 
lower court's ruling granting summary judgement several years ago. 
Norton quotes from that summary judgement to show some of the 
arguments were similar. (Norton brief, p 23 - 25.) 
A. There was no prior lawsuit between NSI and Norton. 
NSI never filed a claim of any kind against Norton in the 
prior lawsuit between Packer and Norton. Because NSI did not file 
a cross-claim, the prior appellate court did not review NSI's 
arguments, and held that , without a cross-claim, NSI had no 
standing to even resist the summary judgment between Packer and 
Norton. Thus the prior lawsuit involved Packer, not NSI. The 
prior case was not "fully and fairly litigated" as required by res 
judicata. NSI and Norton were not even adversaries, as the court 
ruled. 
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B. Norton ignores the law cited by NSI# and cites no additional 
authority. 
NSI cited Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P. 2d 731 
(Ut. 1995) in its original brief. Norton never addressed that 
case, or any other case on res judicata. The Silver Fork case is 
dispositive. "The rendition of a judgment in an action does not 
conclude parties to the action who are not adversaries under the 
pleadings as to their rights . . . " (emphasis added) Id. at 733, 
quoting Restatement of Judgments. The former appellate court 
specifically found that " Neither NSI nor Norton filed cross-claims 
against each other." Packer v. National Service Industries, 909 
P. 2d 1277 (Utah App. 1996) . Norton ignores the case law, evidently 
hoping this court will ignore the law also. 
C. The Packer lawsuit contained no claim of indemnification. 
The lawsuit between Packer and Norton contained no claims for 
indemnification. NSI's claim for indemnification has never been 
litigated, and res judicata is simply not applicable. The lower 
court granted summary judgment only because the prior appellate 
court had not yet ruled, and the lower court stated". . .1 don't 
buy into the argument that you don't . . .have standing, I just 
4 
don't, I think you do. . ." R. p. 218, 1. 10-12. The appellate 
court ruled otherwise, and the lower court turn out to be wrong. 
The summary judgment based on the wrong assumption must be 
overturned. 
D. Conclusion. 
Norton simply ignores the appellate court's ruling when it 
doesn't fit its purpose. In fact the appellate court specifically 
ruled M. . . because NSI did not have a right to respond to 
Norton's motion for summary judgement against the plaintiff, NSI 
has no right to appeal the court's order granting Norton's motion". 
Packer at 1278. Norton obtained summary judgement only against 
the plaintiff, because plaintiff declined to resist the motion. 
NSI and Norton had no standing to even litigate claims against each 
other because neither filed cross claims. Additionally, no 
indemnity claims were even involved. In fact, the former appellate 
court specifically ruled Norton could file an indemnity claim. 
"NSI could also protect any possible claim against Norton by 
finding an independent action claim in indemnity . . ." Id. at 
1211. This claim must be reinstated, as the former appellate court 
ruled. 
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Norton argued to the former appellate court, successfully, 
that NSI had no standing to resist its motion for summary judgment. 
It must now live with that ruling. No judgement on the merits has 
been entered. No claim was even filed between the two parties. No 
"full and fair opportunity" to litigate the claims has occurred. 
Res judicata is simply inapplicable. Norton cites no case law 
because there is no support for its fallacious argument. 
POINT II: "COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" REFLECTS THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE'S INTENT THAT EACH PARTY PAY ITS OWN 
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FAULT. 
Norton argues that this court adopting "comparative implied 
indemnity" "would not affect the outcome of this case" and "would 
be barred by res judicata in any case" Norton brief page 19. 
Norton's claims are simply without foundation. As previously 
pointed out, the appellate court specifically ruled that "NSI could 
also protect a possible claim against Norton by filing an 
independent action claiming indemnity . . . " Packer Supra 1278. 
"Comparative implied indemnity" would affect the outcome of 
this case if NSI were anywhere between one and ninety-nine percent 
liable for this incident. The only time "comparative implied 
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indemnity" would not affect the outcome of the case is if NSI were 
100% liable (there could be no recovery from Norton) or Norton were 
100% liable (NSI would receive a full recovery). 
Norton hopes to abrogate the Utah Legislature's intent that 
each party pay its proportionate share since, under the old 
indemnity law (adopted before the Tort Reform Statute) if Norton 
can show that NSI was only 1% liable the old law would not require 
Norton to pay for its 99% fault. The Tort Reform Statute made 
clear that result is inequitable and not acceptable. This court 
should adopt "comparative implied indemnity" so if Norton is 
determined anywhere between 1% and 99% at fault, that Norton pay 
its proportionate share of fault. Very few cases find one party 
100% liable and the other 0% liable. Based purely on percentages, 
in 99 out of 100 cases, this court's adoption of "comparative 
implied indemnity" would affect the outcome of the case. 
Additionally it will give full effect to the legislative intent 
that Norton pay its own fair share of liability. 
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JU "Comparative Implied Indemnity" and "Contribution" are 
different principles. 
Norton argues that "comparative applied indemnity" is merely 
"contribution". Norton tries throughout its brief to equate all 
NSI's causes of action to "contribution". In fact, rather than 
cite a single case on contribution, Norton instead quotes Black's 
Law Dictionary defining "contribution". Norton attempts a game of 
semantics. "Indemnity" was adopted by this court in the Hanover 
case for product liability cases such as this one. It is distinct 
from contribution. Norton raises no question that indemnity still 
exists in Utah today. This court should simply update Utah's 
indemnity law to reflect the legislative intent, passed since 
indemnity was adopted, that no party should pay more than its 
proportionate share. The current indemnity law violates that 
intent. 
While different courts have used slightly different words to 
describe "comparative implied indemnity", all those courts obtain 
substantial justice by having each party bear its own proportionate 
share of fault. Norton's broad reading of "contribution" is not 
even supported by its own definition. The very next sentence in 
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Black's makes clear that contribution is recovered ". . . from 
other joint tort-feasors . . ." Indemnity is different from 
"contribution," and implied indemnity, adopted by this court in 
Hanover, is not barred by the Tort Reform Statute. 
"Comparative implied indemnity" has been adopted under similar 
circumstances by many courts. The Kennedy appellate court {Kennedy 
v. City of Sawyer, 608 P. 2d 1379, 1386) notes seven such courts 
over fifteen years ago. Norton is correct that some of these 
courts use the term "contribution" in their discussion of 
"comparative implied indemnity." But many of those states still 
had (or even have) contribution because they have joint and several 
liability. One example is the California case which adopted 
comparative implied indemnity, American Motorcycle Ass'n v. 
Superior Court, 578 P. 2d 899 (Ca. 1978) . That case adopted 
comparative principles in indemnity cases, but left in place joint 
and several liability. Norton tries to focus on small differences, 
while it ignores the large similarities. The fact that one state 
retained joint and several liability, and thus still uses the term 
"contribution," does not mean that "comparative implied indemnity" 
is the same as contribution. 
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In fact, contractual indemnity (Hanover states that it is a 
contract implied in law, see Hanover, p 445) is specifically 
exempted from the Tort Reform Statute in Utah Code Anno. §78-27-43 
("Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs 
any right to indemnity or contribution arising from statute, 
contract, or agreement.")Implied indemnity was not contribution 
before the Tort Reform Statute, it does not become contribution now 
by adopting a comparative fault rationale to mirror the 
legislature's intent. 
B. An indemnity suit may be brought in a second, separate suit. 
Norton points out that the Kansas Supreme court in Kennedy vs. 
City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788 (Kansas 1980) was an apportionment 
between defendants in the original suit, not in a later action 
(although Norton says it can "only" occur then, while the very next 
sentence after Norton's quote sometimes allows a second suit). 
However, this is for a very good reason which Norton omits to 
mention. First, it is the explicit law in Kansas. It should also 
be noted that Kansas has a different rule of civil procedure. 
Unlike the Federal and Utah's rules, Kansas specifically requires 
that cross-claims between defendants in tort cases are "compul-
10 
sory." K.S.A. 60-213(g) is entitled "Compulsory cross-claim 
against co-party." Utah has a rule like Kansas' section (h), which 
Kansas even titles "Permissive cross-claim against co-party" 
(emphasis added). Norton's lengthy argument is fallacious because 
Utah's rules of civil procedure are different and clearly make 
cross-claims permissive. 
C. "Comparative implied indemnity" reflects the principles 
underlying the Tort Reform Act and Hanover. 
NSI requests indemnity in the present suit. It is possible 
that NSI could decide to pursue only indemnity in this case (or 
other parties many pursue only indemnity in future cases). The 
intent of the legislature is clear that all parties must pay their 
own proportionate fault. Traditional implied indemnity, adopted by 
this court in the Hanover case (Hanover, Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988)) should be updated, following 
numerous other courts, to do substantial justice as directed by our 
own legislative branch. NSI does not care what particular 
terminology this court decides to apply to such a fair outcome 
dictated by the statute. But "comparative implied indemnity", is 
a term used by other courts which achieves that fairness and walks 
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hand in hand with the statute. It is not ''contribution," which 
even Norton acknowledges is based on joint and several liability, 
and does not contradict the statute. 
Norton argues "If there is any inequity in this scheme it is 
an inequity which the legislature, not this court, must 
address . . . ." Norton Brief at 22. This statement is an 
admission of the inequity inherent in this case and inherent in 
pure implied indemnity. Norton claims this court is powerless to 
correct it but that claim is false. Implied indemnity was adopted 
by this very court in the Hanover case. Implied indemnity was not 
adopted by the legislature. This court clearly has the power to 
adopt a "comparative" type of indemnity, particularly after the 
legislature has indicated its specific intent for each party to pay 
its proportionate share. 
Hanover stated that "The major purpose of strict liability is 
to place the loss caused by a defective product on those who create 
the risk . . ." Hanover at 446. Comparative implied indemnity 
accomplishes this. This court should remand this case for the 
indemnity cause of action to be heard, and should further adopt 
"comparative implied indemnity" so that the lower court will apply 
12 
the principles the legislature adopted in the tort reform, and this 
Court expressed in Hanover. 
DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
PROPORTIONATE FAULT AND REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS 
POINT III: THE TORT REFORM STATUTE SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS CO-
DEFENDANTS TO HAVE EACH OTHER'S PROPORTIONATE FAULT 
DETERMINED. 
It is elementary statutory interpretation that statutes must 
be read as a whole. Norton focuses on one short sentence barring 
"contribution", and argues from that sentence that all NSI's 
actions are simply "contribution" actions "renamed." Norton 
ignores the remainder of the statute and the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Norton's reading of this statute is narrow and unacceptable. 
This statute specifically authorizes a party to seek 
"reimbursement" as NSI has done here. Norton itself acknowledges 
that the statute allows a cross-claim between two defendants to 
have each other's proportionate fault determined. In fact, the 
former appellate court acknowledged in this very case that such a 
cross-claim exists. "However, NSI could have protected its 
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potential claim against Norton by filing a cross-claim against 
Norton under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)" Packer at 1278. 
The issue then, is not whether a cross-claim exists - it 
clearly does. The issue is when can a cross-claim be brought? 
Must it be brought in an initial suit between two co-defendants, or 
may it be brought in an independent suit? Norton argues that a 
second suit is "contribution," and therefore banned. In fact, 
nowhere does Norton cite any authority for its argument. 
POINT IV: CROSS-CLAIMS ARE NEVER COMPULSORY, 
Norton does not cite any authority that even suggests that an 
allowable cross claim is mandatory, and is waived if not filed in 
an original suit. Norton does not discuss Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 13(f), which makes cross claims permissive, nor any of 
the numerous authorities NSI cited in its original brief. 
Pages 14-19 in NSI's original brief cited authority and 
reasons why cross-claims are not compulsory. Norton cites no 
contrary authority. As the Augustin case summarizes u. . .a party 
to an action having a claim in the nature of a cross-claim has the 
option to pursue it in an independent action." Augustin v. Mughal, 
521 F.2d 1215, 1216 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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Norton ignores the numerous policy reasons behind cross-claims 
being permissive. Among the reasons are that co-defendants have a 
say in the choice of the form and the timing of the litigation. 
Likewise Norton totally ignores, as Wright Miller and Kane Federal 
Practice and Procedure , Section 1431 states, "a party who 
decides not to bring this claim under Rule 13(g) (Utah's 13(f) will 
not be barred by res judicata, waiver, or estoppel from asserting 
in a later action . . . " ) . Norton ignores that if there is no 
right of one defendant to have another defendant's proportionate 
fault determined now, then there is no such right to cross-claim in 
the original suit. That exists now. Substantive law, here the 
Utah Tort Reform Statute, determines whether a right between such 
co-defendants exists. If it does not exist, no cross claim can 
ever be filed between defendants. If it does exist, the cross 
claim may be brought in an independent action, such as this one. 
POINT V. DUPLICATIVE SUITS 
Norton expresses the law's concern about duplicative suits. 
There is an entire body of law, that of res judicata, which will 
prevent duplicate suits. Both before and after the Tort Reform 
Statute, if two defendants "fully and fairly litigated" the issues 
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between them, they cannot relitigate them later. Both before and 
after the Tort Reform Statute the rules of civil procedure, clearly 
allow parties to litigate any right which the statute gives them. 
Co-defendants generally have the same incentive to resolve all 
causes of action in an initial suit. However, in unusual 
circumstances, such as occurred here, NSI's claim that Norton's 
fault should be determined can be brought later. Norton's fault 
has yet to be litigated. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court wrongly dismissed the claims to have Norton's 
proportionate fault determined. NSI simply requests that Norton's 
fault be determined. This is fair, equitable, and allowed by this 
statute. Norton's brief hinges on a narrow reading of the statute, 
ignoring the rules of civil procedure, and ignoring the case law 
and commentators. Black's Law Dictionary is the most authoritative 
citation found by Norton. Even Black's defines "contribution" as 
dealing with the old joint and several liability language. It is 
not applicable here. It is telling that Norton (with the exception 
of State vs. Taylor, 818 P. 2d 561 (Utah App. 1991) holding the 
appellate court should review the trial court's conclusion for 
16 
correctness) does not cite a single case which was not used in 
NSI's original brief supporting its arguments. 
Norton cites no case suggesting the rules of civil procedure 
can be ignored, and cross-claims made compulsory based on a broad 
reading of the word "contribution" in the statute. Norton cites no 
case even suggesting that a cause of action for proportionate fault 
can exist in an original case between two defendants, but somehow 
vanishes later. Norton cites not one rule of civil procedure nor 
even discusses them. Norton cites no commentator who would lend 
any support on Norton's claim that NSI had a compulsory cross-claim 
that has now been negated by not being filed in the original suit. 
Norton not even cites a case defining contribution in the broad 
manner which it suggest it should apply. 
Norton's brief inasmuch as acknowledges that an injustice has 
been done in this case, but claims the legislature, and not this 
court is responsible, and only the legislature can correct it. 
That is simply not the case. The Tort Reform Act allows a cross-
claim for one defendant to have another defendant's proportion of 
fault determined. The prior appellate court so stated. Norton 
itself acknowledges that an indemnity suit can be brought against 
17 
co-defendant International. "Reimbursement" is specifically 
authorized by the statute. NSI is suing for that reimbursement -
for a reasonable settlement which courts encourage. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 13 (f) allows the cause of action to be brought in 
an independent action. The dismissal of the claims under the Tort 
Reform Statute for failure to state a claim was in error. 
The summary judgment was also in error. The indemnity claims 
were never litigated between these two parties, and are not barred 
by res judicata. No cross-claim was even filed. The indemnity 
claims must also be remanded, and this court should adopt 
comparative implied indemnity to reflect the fairness underlying 
the Tort Reform Statute and the Hanover case. 
Remanding this case will result in fairness and justice not 
only in this case but others to follow. Norton's proportionate 
fault must be determined. Norton must pay the damages which its 
fault caused. 
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B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a California : Civil No. 950900951CV 
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL) 
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC., : Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Noel de Nevers, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of all facts stated in this affidavit. 
2. I conducted certain tests on a metal pail manufactured by B.W. Norton Manufacturing in 
the Packer v, NSI case. 
3.1 conducted tests to determine if a pressure build up could occur in these metal pails, what 
would happen when they were opened and the cause of the pressure. 
4. I tested a can from the same product batch, similar to the one that injured the plaintiff, and 
I determined a pressure buildup had in fact occurred in the can. 
5. There are three potential causes for this pressure: 1) a chemical reaction involving the 
contents of the container; 2) a change in temperature from when the container was sealed to when 
it was opened; or 3) a change in altitude from where the container was sealed to where it was opened. 
6. I tested the gas space ("head space") inside the subject container, and found it contained 
only nitrogen and oxygen, mostly in the same proportions as they exist in atmospheric air. There 
was no indication of any gases produced by a chemical reaction inside the container. 
7. 1 made no tests of the pressure change caused by increasing the temperature of the 
container and its contents. However, an increase in that temperature would certainly cause an 
increase in container pressure. 
8. Transporting the pail from sea level to the altitude of the Wasatch Front would create 
approximately 2.2 psi of pressure within the pail. That pressure would propel the cap at a speed of 
approximately 30 to 160 miles per hour. 
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9. The build up of pressure that caused the cap to be propelled upwards in the Packer v. NSI 
case was due to a change in altitude and temperature and not due to a chemical reaction. 
10. There was no pressure relief feature built into the Norton pail to relieve this pressure that 
occurs with a change in altitude. 
11. Because the pressure build up was from altitude and temperature changes, and not from 
a chemical reaction, a similar explosion of the cap would occur regardless of the contents of the 
container, or even if the container contained only air. 
I say "similar" because the calculations of the speed of the seal in this affidavit are based on 
altitude only. The temperature rise would increase the explosive speed of the seal, but I have not yet 
determined how much of an increase temperature would make. This increase due to temperature 
may differ between liquids. 
12. It is my opinion that a container which allows the seal to be propelled at these speeds 
because of normal altitude and temperature differences which regularly occur during normal 
shipping is unreasonably dangerous. 
DATED this ' ^ d a y of September, 1995. 
NOELDENEVERS 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
lis 13^ Subscribed to before me this '- } ' day of September, 1995 
, mm mm mm mm mm mm mm m* 
Notary PuNle • 
^RISTI£ J. PERRY I 
878R«tAwn?2 | 
SflUUtoCjVsUt* 84103 J 
NOTARY PUBLJC7 / ' ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 1995, a true and accurate copy of the 
Affidavit of Dr. Noel de Nevers was mailed to the following: 
Paul M. Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
STRONG &HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Pamela K. McDermaid 
5 
